Structural Analysis of Article V: The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention to Propose Amendments by O\u27Sullivan, Damian
 291 
COMMENTS 
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Damian O’Sullivan*
INTRODUCTION 
Conventions have been a feature of American governance dating at least 
as far back as the seventeenth century.  Most conventions prior to the 
Philadelphia Convention were limited in scope to address discrete subjects.  
The Framers and Ratifiers not only understood how these conventions 
functioned, but also in many cases personally took part in them.  When 
debating proposals for what would become Article V, the Framers insisted 
on, and unanimously consented to the addition of, a convention of states, 
along with Congress, as the two alternative mechanisms for proposing 
amendments to the Constitution.1  They did so partly out of concern that 
permitting Congress alone to propose amendments would block even 
beneficial amendments simply because they also reduce congressional power.  
This fear has become reality today.  The convention method of proposing 
amendments has been all but rendered nugatory.  Having never been used, 
its prospect sparks concern of a runaway convention that might precipitate a 
constitutional crisis.  The structural benefits of the bifurcated proposal system 
 
 * Executive Editor, Volume 22, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law; J.D. Candidate, 
2020, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 2017, Cornell University. I am grateful to 
Professor William Ewald for his guidance, to Sierra Blazer and Ryan Yuffe for their helpful 
comments, and most importantly to Kathy O’Sullivan and Jack Brandeis for their tremendous 
support. 
 1 The relevant text of Article V reads as follows:  
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall 
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, 
in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when 
ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress.   
  U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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have therefore not been realized.  A convention that is limited in scope to a 
specified subject matter, which is precisely what states submit their 
applications to convene, mitigates this concern of unpredictable change and 
makes this method viable for proposing amendments that may limit 
congressional power.  The text, the history, and, most powerfully, the 
structure of Article V illustrate that a limited convention is constitutional and 
can reinvigorate the federalist nature of Article V by reinstating the intended 
balance of federal and state power in proposing amendments and 
effectuating constitutional change. 
I.  THE NEED FOR AN AMENDMENT PROVISION 
The Articles of Confederation suffered from a number of flaws,2 chief 
among which was that its fundamentally unworkable amendment provision 
prevented even manifestly apparent defects from being rectified.3  Indeed, it 
was never successfully used.4  Amendment required both congressional 
agreement and unanimous ratification by state legislatures.5  This system gave 
each state a veto over any amendment.6  It served as an effective bar to 
amendment and led to the defeat of a number of attempts to institute features 
that would become foundational under the Constitution, prominently 
including powers of Congress to collect import duties, regulate commerce, 
and exercise coercive power over the states in the event of non-compliance 
 
 2 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of Government in the United States (1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 348–58 (Angela Kreider et al. eds., 2018) (noting that these flaws included, 
inter alia: states’ failures to abide by constitutional requirements and federal authority, states’ 
violating the rights of one another, and a general inability to act in concert for the common good).  
 3 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 285 (2006) (“[I]t quickly 
became apparent to the delegates that the Confederation document’s biggest—and indeed fatal—
flaw was its practical unamendability”); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING 
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 337 (2009) (noting that the “lack of a workable method for 
amendment” was among the fatal defects of the Articles of Confederation).  
 4 KATHLEEN O. POTTER, THE FEDERALIST’S VISION OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN THE NEW 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 92 (2002).  
 5 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII (“[Amendments must] be agreed to in a 
Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”). 
 6 See POTTER, supra note 4, at 93 (explaining that Rhode Island’s decision to not even send delegates 
to the Convention illustrates how untenable the unanimity requirement was given that even 
bringing each state together to consider constitutional amendments, let alone agreeing upon them, 
was prohibitively difficult). 
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with Congressional directives.7  This shortcoming was exacerbated by 
Congress’s own consistent failure to agree upon proposed amendments in the 
first place.8  The infeasibility of amendment under the Articles both 
necessitated going beyond the task of amending that regime to form a 
government anew and placed the need to provide a mechanism for 
amending the Constitution in a position of prominence at the Philadelphia 
Convention.9   
The delegates resolved to provide an easier mode of amendment than 
that established by the Articles.10  As Hamilton described, “[i]t had been 
wished by many and was much to have been desired that an easier mode for 
introducing amendments had been provided by the Articles of 
Confederation.”11  The Framers were cognizant of the fact that allowing the 
Constitution to be too readily amended would produce instability;12 
however, the delegates also recognized that requiring unanimous consent of 
the state legislatures was too restrictive.13  The experience under the Articles 
 
 7 Attempts to Revise the Articles of Confederation, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE AM. CONSTITUTION, 
https://csac.history.wisc.edu/document-collections/confederation-period/attempts-to-revise/ 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019).  
 8 See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 27 (1988) (noting that the initial draft of what would become Article 
V of the Constitution excluded Congress because of its “failure to propose amendments in the 
immediately preceding years”).  
 9 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 285–92 (noting that “the amendment issues defined the first and 
most fundamental item of business to be addressed at Philadelphia”; the delegates could not abide 
by the Articles because of its rigid and untenable amendment provision, and this paradox illustrated 
the necessity of including a viable amendment procedure in the Constitution to avoid having to 
exceed the powers accorded by a governing document in the future); DARREN PATRICK GUERRA, 
PERFECTING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CASE FOR THE ARTICLE V AMENDMENT PROCESS 69 
(2013) (“The debate over the scope of the Convention’s authority and the mode of ratification are 
clearly related to the issue of amendment in that they all seek to define the manner in which the 
sovereign authority of the people should be exercised for the purposes of founding a constitution.”).  
 10 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 557–58 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND]. 
 11 Id.; see also CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 20 (noting that Hamilton had long been motivated by the 
ineffectiveness of the Articles to fundamentally alter them, having recommended “calling 
immediately a convention of all the states . . . vested with plenipotentiary authority” to amend the 
Articles and create a “solid coercive union” as early as 1780).  
 12 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasizing 
that the amendment provision “guards . . . against that extreme facility, which would render the 
Constitution too mutable”). 
 13 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 251 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (assailing 
“the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a 
thirteenth”).  
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inculcated the idea that amendments “will be necessary, and it will be better 
to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust 
to chance and violence.”14  Because the difficulty inherent in drafting and 
ratifying an agreeable constitution made clear that the document would not 
be without error,15 the benefit of experience coupled with a functional means 
of making future alterations was essential to the viability of this constitutional 
experiment.16 
In addition to aiming to provide long-term stability to the Constitution, 
Article V proved critical to the Constitution’s adoption and ratification.17  
The Articles had failed to produce an effective federal government, revisions 
of the Constitution would be needed, and it was better to adopt this 
Constitution and work within that framework than to resign to failure.18  The 
feasible prospect of amendment, precipitated at the proposal stage at the 
federal or state level, provided a basis to accept the perceived defects that 
necessarily result from the compromise at play in a convention, and 
 
 14 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 203.  
 15 See id. at 122 (“The novelty and difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision.”).  
 16 See, e.g., id. at 439 (emphasizing that “should there be any defects, they will trust a future convention 
with the power of making further amendments”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 278 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“That useful alterations will be suggested by experience, 
could not but be foreseen.  It was requisite therefore that a mode for introducing them should be 
provided.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting 
that the “novelty of the undertaking” of drafting a constitution means that the convention can only 
aspire to avoid errors of the past and provide for a means of correcting errors that will be unveiled 
in time under the new Constitution). 
 17 AMAR, supra note 3, at 286 (“During the ratification period, the kinetic interplay between the old 
article XIII and the new Article V helped propel the Constitution forward, as Federalists cleverly 
urged skeptics to ratify an admittedly imperfect Philadelphia document and then work to amend 
it.”); see also GUERRA, supra note 9, at 75–93 (tracing the role that Article V played in the ratification 
debates, state by state, to illustrate how the presence of a workable amendment mechanism with 
both state and federal proposal powers allayed concerns with the Constitution by emphasizing that 
flaws could be later altered as needed); THOMAS E. BRENNAN, THE ARTICLE V AMENDATORY 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: KEEPING THE REPUBLIC IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 
(2014) (stating that Article V “was a pivotal point in the debates leading up to the ratification of the 
1787 Constitution”).  
 18 See, e.g., 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 202–03 (“The plan now to be formed will certainly be 
defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be.  Amendments therefore will be 
necessary . . . .”); see also id. at 532 (“The condition of the U. States requires that something should 
be immediately done.  It will be better that a defective plan should be adopted, than that none 
should be recommended.  [Bedford] saw no reason why defects might not be supplied by meetings 
10, 15 or 20 years hence.”). 
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warranted ratifying the Constitution.19  The importance of this argument in 
garnering support for the Constitution is evidenced by the appeal contained 
in the last essay of The Federalist; imperfect as the document may be, 
experience and time will bring the Constitution toward perfection through 
amendment.20 
II.  DRAFTING ARTICLE V AND THE ROLE OF STATES IN PROPOSING 
AMENDMENTS 
Determining the appropriate role for Congress in amending the 
Constitution was at the forefront of the initial debate over drafting the 
amendment provision at the Convention.21  What would become Article V 
originated as the thirteenth of fifteen proposals laid out in the Virginia Plan.22  
This version provided that the Constitution should be amended whenever 
necessary, and that the consent of Congress was not required.23  The 
delegates shared conflicting opinions on whether or not Congress should be 
so excluded.24  This exclusion was motivated by the failure of Congress to 
propose needed amendments under the Articles;25 nevertheless, some 
delegates doubted the “propriety of making the consent of [Congress] 
unnecessary.”26  George Mason forcefully responded that it would be 
 
 19 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 558 (“It had been wished by many and was much to have been 
desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments had been provided by the articles of 
Confederation.  It was equally desirable now that an easy mode should be established for supplying 
defects which will probably appear in the new System.”). 
 20 POTTER, supra note 4, at 91–92 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he 
judgments of many must unite in this work [of amending errors]: Experience must guide their labor; 
Time must bring it to perfection; And the Feeling of inconveniences must correct the mistakes 
which they inevitably fall unto, in their first trials and experiments.”)). 
 21 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 3, at 338 (expressing Hamilton’s concern that state legislatures would 
only amend the Constitution “to increase their own powers,” and hence the need for Congress to 
also be empowered to call for a convention); 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 202–03 (recording debate 
around adopting resolution allowing the Constitution to be amended without consent of national 
legislature); 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 468 (noting a suggestion that Congress “should be left at 
liberty to call a Convention, whenever they please”).  
 22 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 121.  
 23 Id. (stating “that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to be 
established, without requiring the assent of the National Legislature”).  
 24 Id. at 121–22 (showing two delegates argue about the propriety of amending the Constitution 
without the assent of Congress).  
 25 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 27. 
 26 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 202.  
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“improper to require the consent of [Congress], because they may abuse 
their power, and refuse their consent on that very account.”27  The discussion 
was tabled to await redrafting that would take into account these disparate 
positions.28   
The Committee of Detail’s draft of what would become Article V 
provided for a convention called by two-thirds of state legislatures, absent 
any requirement of Congressional assent.29  Alexander Hamilton objected to 
the decision to allow states alone to propose amendments.30  He began his 
argument with the premise that this amendment provision was designed to 
enable an easier method of amending defects than was permitted under the 
Articles.31  Much like George Mason feared that requiring the assent of 
Congress would result only in amendment proposals that steered clear of 
limiting Congressional power,32 Hamilton argued that states, should they 
alone be empowered to amend the Constitution, would do so only to 
augment their own power vis-à-vis Congress.33  The exercise of proposal 
power by Congress, Hamilton argued, is not to be feared because it is 
constrained by the people having the ultimate say;34 Congress’s role is merely 
to call a convention of the states at which amendments will be proposed.35    
Roger Sherman’s suggestion of an alternative method of proposing 
amendments via Congress—subject to the approval of the states—was 
intended to bridge the gap between the Committee of Detail’s draft and 
 
 27 Id. at 203.  
 28 Id.   
 29 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 159 (“This Constitution ought to be amended whenever such 
Amendment shall become necessary; and on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
States in the Union, the Legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that Purpose.”).   
 30 Id. at 558 (arguing that Congress may be better able to discern and correct constitutional defects 
and should therefore have the ability to initiate the amendment process). 
 31 Id. at 557 (“It had been wished by many . . . that an easier mode for introducing amendments had 
been provided by the articles of Confederation.”). 
 32 Id. at 629 (“As the proposing of amendments is . . . to depend . . . on Congress, no amendments of 
the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become 
oppressive, as [Mason] verily believed would be the case.”).  
 33 Id. at 558 (“The mode proposed was not adequate.  The State Legislatures will not apply for 
alterations but with a view to increase their own powers— The National Legislature will be the first 
to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought also be empowered, 
whenever two thirds of each branch should concur to call a Convention . . . .”).  
 34 Id. (“There could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide in the case.”).  
 35 Id. (“The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will be most sensible to the necessity 
of amendments, an ought also to be empowered, whenever two thirds of each branch should concur 
to call a Convention . . . .”).  
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Hamilton’s perceived defects.36  James Wilson proffered the addition of “two-
thirds” before the several states.37  This motion was initially defeated, but was 
then approved once Wilson changed two-thirds to three-fourths.38  This 
change gave rise to Article V’s bifurcated proposal system, under which 
either two-thirds of the states or two-thirds of both Houses of Congress 
initiate the amendment process.39  Its dual nature accounts for the concern 
that the self-interest of either group could prevent popularly supported 
change where such amendment would curtail the power of the proposing 
entity.    
Madison put forth a draft that included these agreed upon changes but 
that nevertheless maintained an outsized role for Congress.40  His proposal 
provided that either Congress or state legislatures could initiate the 
amendment process, but in either case, Congress would propose the 
amendments.41  This intentional creation of a role for a convention of the 
states42 only in ratifying, but not in proposing, reflected Madison’s concern 
 
 36 Id. (“Mr. Sherman moved to add to the article ‘or the Legislature may propose amendments to the 
several States for their approbation, but no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the 
several States.’”). 
 37 Id. (“Mr. Wilson moved to insert ‘two thirds of’ before the words ‘several States’”). 
 38 Id. at 558–59 (“Mr. Wilson then moved to insert ‘three fourths of’ before ‘the several St[ate]s’ which 
was agreed to . . . .”). 
 39 U.S. CONST. art. V.   
 40 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 559 (“The Legislature of the U— S— whenever two thirds of both 
Houses shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several 
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and 
purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at least of the 
Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as one or the other 
mode of ratification may be proposed by the Legislature of the U. S.”).  
 41 Id. 
 42 The phrase “convention of the states” is used to describe the convention prescribed by Article V 
throughout this Comment.  Its use dates back to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1789 
referring to an Article V “convention of the states.”  MINUTES OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF PA., 
58–61 (Mar. 24, 1789).   It has been used by the Supreme Court as early as 1831.  Smith v. Union 
Bank, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 518, 528 (1831).  The phrase had also been used in the United States prior 
to the Philadelphia Convention such as in a letter to Gouverneur Morris from Henry Knox in 1783, 
where Knox asked that Morris help call such a convention to address governmental defects.  1 
JARED SPARKS, LIFE OF GOUVERNEUR MORRIS 256 (1832).  Its historied role in political 
philosophy is illustrated by analogous phrasing used by Thomas Hobbes at least as early as 1642.  
THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 
103 (Howard Warrender ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1983) (1651) (stating that citizens “may call a new 
convention of estates”).  
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that a second convention might undermine the progress made at the 
Philadelphia Convention.43  
The primacy of Congress’s role of proposing amendments drew strong 
objection from a number of delegates.44  George Mason deemed the proposal 
mechanism in Madison’s draft susceptible to abuse, writing in the margin of 
his copy of the proposal that “should [Congress] prove ever so oppressive, 
the whole people of America can’t make, or even propose alterations to [the 
Constitution]; a doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of 
the rights and liberties of the people.”45  Mason argued that because either 
method of amending was dependent on Congress, beneficial amendments 
would never be proposed in the event that Congress should amass and seek 
to retain exceptional power for itself.46  Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge 
Gerry shared this concern, proposing to resolve it by requiring a convention 
of the states on the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures.47  This 
change was accepted without noted objection.48  Even Madison, despite his 
fear of a second convention, “saw no objection however against providing 
for a Convention for the purpose of amendments.”49  This compromise 
produced Article V’s current method of proposal either by Congress or by a 
convention of the states.50    
 
 43 See BEEMAN, supra note 3, at 339 (“Madison hoped at all costs to avoid the calling of additional 
constitutional conventions, for he feared that such conventions might well undo the work they were 
doing in Philadelphia.”); see also 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 632 (relaying Charles Pinckney’s 
statement that “[c]onventions are serious things, and ought not to be repeated[.]”).   
 44 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 629–31 (recording delegates’ concerns about the proposed 
amendment process). 
 45 Id. at 629 n.8. 
 46 Id. at 629 (“[This] plan of amending the Constitution [is] exceptionable [and] dangerous.  As the 
proposing of amendments is in both modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the second, 
ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, 
if the Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would be the case.”).  
 47 Id. (“Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Gerry moved to amend the article so as to require a Convention on 
application of 2/3 of the Sts.”). 
 48 Id. at 630 (“The motion of Mr. Govr Morris and Mr. Gerry was agreed to . . . .”). 
 49 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 29. 
 50 U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two 
thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . . .”).   
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III.  THE PROSPECT OF A LIMITED CONVENTION OF STATES 
Despite the ultimate insistence on maintaining a role for the states in 
proposing amendments at the Philadelphia Convention, a convention of the 
states has never been used to amend the Constitution.51  State legislatures 
nevertheless have applied, and continue to apply, for such a convention to 
propose amendments.52  Applications by state legislatures in the early 
republic are credited with having prompted Congress to propose what would 
become known as the Bill of Rights53 out of a concern that, had it not, it 
would have been compelled to call a convention of states upon the 
submission of enough applications.54  There have been well over four-
hundred applications for a convention of states in the ensuing time,55 yielding 
no conventions and applying minimal influence.  One reason these 
applications have failed to produce a convention is that applications have 
identified a variety of limited and specific topics.56  States also periodically 
 
 51 See, e.g., BRENNAN, supra note 17, at 8–9 (emphasizing that although there have been in excess of 
11,000 amendments introduced by Congress, never once has an amendment been proposed by the 
states to be submitted for ratification). 
 52 See House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (showing that 
applications were submitted to Congress as recently as September of 2019).  
 53 Use of the phrase “Bill of Rights” to designate the first ten amendments did not emerge until the 
twentieth century.  PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787–1788, at 459–67 (2010).  
 54 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 290 (“[A convention’s] mere potential availability might suffice to 
pry needed amendment proposals from a Congress desirous of maintaining control over the 
amendment agenda . . . this is precisely what happened with the Bill of Rights, which the First 
Congress drafted largely to silence cries for a new convention.”); CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 32–40 
(noting that the submission of the Bill of Rights to the states for ratification quelled the “pressure 
for another constitutional convention”); Michael Stokes Paulson, A General Theory of Article V: The 
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 740–41 (1993) (“Congress 
proposed a Bill of Rights . . . but if it had not done so . . . Congress might well have been obliged 
to call a convention in response to a sufficient number of formal state applications.”).  
 55 See Paulson, supra note 54, at 736 (“There have been nearly four hundred convention applications 
submitted by the fifty states over the past 205 years.”); House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, 
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2019) (listing the forty-five additional applications submitted in the intervening 
twenty-seven years to present day that Paulson could not take into account).  
 56 See House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (follow the state hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019) (illustrating the variety of topics for which applications are submitted). 
 
300 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
   
 
rescind applications.57  The result has been that the required two-thirds of 
states have never had pending applications for the same subject to call a 
convention.58  Today, there are more than 100 outstanding applications 
submitted to Congress by state legislatures pursuant to Article V.59  Limited 
conventions to propose balanced budget amendments or congressional term 
limit amendments are prominently and consistently featured.60 
The ongoing submission of applications for a convention of states to take 
up specific amendments raises the critical question of whether a convention 
of states can be limited by subject matter.  This question analytically consists 
of two parts.  The first is whether applications for a limited convention of 
states are valid under Article V.  The second is whether amendments 
proposed by a limited convention that go beyond the scope of the 
applications can be validly ratified and take on legal effect.  The answer to 
this inquiry into limited conventions is important because the chief concern 
animating opposition to a convention of the states is that such a convention 
will take radical steps to amend the Constitution in unpredictable ways or, at 
a minimum, will produce results that differ from the expectations of the states 
that applied for the convention in the first place.61  The text, history, and 
structure of Article V illustrate that a limited convention comports with 
 
 57 House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (showing states’ 
rescinded applications).  
 58 See Paulson, supra note 54, at 735–36 (explaining that states have asked that a “convention be called 
to address specific topics, such as balanced budgets, reapportionment, school prayer, busing, and 
abortion,” but that the assumption has been that applications for different limited conventions 
cannot be aggregated to reach the required thirty-four states needed to call a convention); House 
Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (follow the state hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 5, 
2019) (showing states’ applications for a convention on differing topics). 
 59 See House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (listing 145 
applications along with 24 rescissions submitted by state legislatures).   
 60 Id. 
 61 See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 
198–99 (1972) (emphasizing that a convention of states is inherently an unlimited convention that 
can produce unpredictable and dangerous results); Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a 
Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 81 CONST. COMMENT. 53, 55–56 (2012) (“The most 
important reason why the convention method does not work is the fear of a runaway convention.”).  
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Article V,62 and that amendments proposed that exceeded those limitations 
do not validly amend the Constitution.63   
A.  The Textual Basis for a Limited Convention 
The relevant text does not constrain conventions to those with plenary 
power to propose amendments of any kind.  Article V states that Congress, 
“on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . . .”64  The text speaks 
broadly of a “Convention for proposing,” not limiting it to a plenary 
convention of the states.65  Plenary in this context means the power to make 
substantial structural shifts in the Constitution as opposed to being limited to 
a discrete subject-matter or topic.  The word “convention” is best understood 
in the context of 1787, during which time the Framers and Ratifiers were 
personally familiar with limited conventions of varying scopes.66  
Conventions’ scopes were ordinarily limited by their call.67  For example, the 
 
 62 Numerous scholars argue for a far more capacious understanding of Article V than posited here.  
Michael B. Rappaport argues that a limited convention may not only be limited to subject matter, 
as contended here, but also to specifically worded amendments.  Rappaport, supra note 61, at 72 
(“[A] convention [limited to a specifically worded amendment] meets the definition of a proposing 
convention, because it has the power to offer an amendment for adoption by the states.”).  Akhil 
Reed Amar argues that Article V does not set the outer bounds of constitutional amendments, 
rather it sets a floor in addition to which a majority of the people can amend the Constitution 
without abiding by the processes laid out in Article V.  Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: 
Amending the Constitution Outside of Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1054–55 (1988) (“[A]lthough 
Article V is best read as the exclusive mode of governmental amendment absent participation by the 
People, it should not be understood as binding the People themselves . . . .”) (emphasis in original).  
 63 One author takes a slightly different perspective, arguing that Congress does not have to put up for 
ratification any proposal that exceeds the scope of the application; legal scrutiny to such an 
amendment should deem it unconstitutional, but sufficiently long-standing practice in accordance 
with such an amendment nevertheless “can attain [for it] a secure place in the Constitution by 
virtue of public acquiescence.”  CAPLAN, supra note 8, at x (1988).  
 64 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 65 See Rappaport, supra note 61, at 64–65 (arguing that the text is sufficiently broad to include both 
limited and unlimited conventions; a limited call from Congress would confine the states to the 
prescribed scope because the convention’s power is derived from Congress, and the text obligates 
Congress to call a convention upon application by two-thirds of the state-legislates, meaning that 
such request for a limited convention is constitutionally required).  
 66 See, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 8, at x (noting that “one reason article V is so terse is because the salient 
features of conventions were generally well understood.”). 
 67 See Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for 
Proposing Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 629 (2013) (“The usual role of a multi-state convention 
was as a problem-solving task force, so the call necessarily specified the issue or issues to be 
addressed.”). 
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Annapolis Convention that preceded the Philadelphia Convention was 
limited to proposals pertaining to commerce.68   
State constitutions enacted at the time of the Philadelphia Convention 
provide further evidence that Article V does not prohibit limited 
conventions.  The most notable such state constitution was Georgia’s, which 
called for conventions limited to determining whether to adopt proposals set 
forth by counties that petitioned for such changes.69  The expansive language 
of Article V in conjunction with the contextual meaning of the word 
“convention” provides a strong textual basis for construing Article V to 
provide for both limited and unlimited conventions of the states.  
By 1786 there was a long and consequential history of the role of 
conventions in the political system that formed the backdrop to the text of 
Article V.70  Prior to the American experience, Scotland regularly called 
conventions of estates at least as early as the sixteenth century, which were 
called outside of Parliament’s control to respond to given emergencies as they 
arose.71  In the century prior to the Philadelphia Convention, there were at 
least thirty-two multi-state or multi-colony conventions, eleven of which 
occurred between 1776 and 1786.72  A convention was an assembly, similarly 
structured to a legislature but distinguishable on the ground that a 
convention serves a more specific purpose than a legislature does.73  Noah 
Webster highlighted this distinction in 1788 by stating that a convention “is 
no more than a Legislature chosen for one particular purpose of supremacy; 
 
 68 See CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 22–23 (describing that “the Virginia legislature adopted a resolution . 
. . for a convention to survey trade issues affecting the country as a whole, with a view to alterations 
in the Articles that would enhance Congress’s power to regulate Commerce.”); Michael B. 
Rappaport, The Constitutionality of a Limited Convention: An Originalist Analysis, 81 CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMMENTARY 53, 68 (2012) (“The Annapolis Convention, which had preceded the Philadelphia 
Convention, was also a limited convention. . . . [T]he convention would propose measures relating 
to commerce.”).  
 69 See Michael B. Rappaport, supra note 61, at 68 (“[T]he best interpretation of [Article LXIII of 
Georgia’s constitution] is that it limits conventions to deciding whether to adopt the alterations 
recommended by the petitioning counties.”).   
 70 See CAPLAN, supra note 8, at ix (“Now an exotic institution, the convention was a tradition already 
over a century old when it became part of the Constitution with article V.”).  
 71 See, e.g., MOWBRAY MORRIS, CLAVERHOUSE 158 (1887) (speaking of the need to “leave Edinburgh 
and to call a Convention of Estates at Stirling”).  
 72 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 620 (2013).  
 73 Robert G. Natelson, Amending the Constitution by Convention: Practical Guidance for Citizens and Policymakers 
6 (Independence Inst., Working Paper No. IP-6-2012, 2012), https://i2i.org/wp-
content/uploads/II-Paper-III-Rules.pdf.  
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whereas an ordinary Legislature is competent to all purposes of 
supremacy.”74  Both the Framers and the Ratifiers had extensive exposure to 
and had participated in prior conventions, including but not limited to the 
following delegates at the Philadelphia Convention: Roger Sherman, John 
Dickinson, Oliver Ellsworth, John Rutledge, James Madison, Alexander 
Hamilton, Elbridge Gerry, and Edmund Randolph.75  These figures played 
a pivotal role in drafting Article V.76  
The use of conventions as features of the amendment process prescribed 
by state constitutions similarly informed the understanding of Article V’s 
text.77  In the aftermath of Lexington and Concord, Congress recommended 
to the assemblies and conventions of the colonies that they adopt their own 
state governments.78  Eleven of the thirteen colonies created new 
governments in accordance with Congress’s declaration, while Connecticut 
and Rhode Island resolved to remain bound by their colonial charters.79  
These eleven states provided the first state constitutions that served as 
imperfect templates for the drafting of the Constitution at the Philadelphia 
Convention.80  Of the eight state constitutions that provided for amendment, 
five included an option for amendment by convention, and three81 permitted 
amendment by the legislature alone.82  Georgia’s amendment provision 
bears the greatest similarity to Article V in that it provided for counties to 
 
 74 NOAH WEBSTER, On Government, in A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE WRITINGS ON 
MORAL, HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY SUBJECTS 54–55 (Boston, Thomas & Andrews 
1790) (ebook), http://www.gutenberg.org/files/44416/44416-h/44416-h.htm#Pg049. 
 75 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 681 (2013).  
 76 See supra Parts I–II (detailing the roles played by key figures in shaping Article V). 
 77 See id. at 622 (drawing a causal link between at least one state constitution and a draft of Article V).  
 78 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 9 (“Resolved, That it be recommended to the respective assemblies and 
conventions of the United Colonies, . . . to adopt such government as shall, in the opinion of the 
representatives of the people, best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents in 
particular, and America in general.”).  
 79 Id. at 10.  
 80 See AMAR, supra note 3, at 287–290 (noting that with respect to drafting Article V in particular, the 
flaws among the state constitutions were sought to be remedied by the draft, with notable successes). 
 81 The states were Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, and each included provisions that made 
amendments more difficult to implement than by mere majority vote.  CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 14.  
This higher bar preserved the supremacy of the constitutions as higher than ordinary law.  
 82 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 14.  
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petition for a convention to propose amendments on specified subjects,83 
though interpretations of how it was to function differ, which is further 
complicated by the fact that it was never used.84  This provision may even 
have provided the “immediate inspiration” for permitting states to apply to 
Congress to call a convention for proposing amendments in Article V,85 
which is noteworthy because there the assembly was tasked with calling a 
convention with the limited scope of “specifying the alterations to be 
made.”86 
The multi-state or multi-colony conventions that predated the 
Philadelphia Convention were commonly limited in scope.  In fact, the 
Massachusetts Convention of 1779–1780 was the first constitutional 
convention with a truly unlimited scope.87  Defense-oriented conventions, 
and those pertaining to dealings with the Indian tribes were common prior 
to the Philadelphia Convention.88  The Providence Convention of 1776–
1777 exemplifies a relatively narrowly limited convention, called to confer 
on the subjects of paper currency and public credit.89  Given the history of 
limited conventions to which the Framers were accustomed, the 
“Convention for proposing Amendments” does not compel the narrow 
interpretation that a convention of states can only be of an unlimited nature.  
 
 83 GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LXIII (“No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions 
from a majority of the counties . . . at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called 
for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made . . . .”).   
 84 Compare AMAR, supra note 3, at 288 (“Georgia’s constitution of 1777 aimed to cure the problem [of 
legislative self-dealing] by enabling citizens to petition for a special convention that would propose 
amendments.”) with Michael B. Rappaport, supra note 61, at 68 (“[T]he best interpretation of 
[Article LXIII of Georgia’s Constitution] is that it limits conventions to deciding whether to adopt 
the alterations recommended by the petitioning counties.”). 
 85 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 622 (2013) (describing article LXIII of Georgia’s Constitution as 
seemingly having provided the “immediate inspiration for the application procedure” in Article V).   
 86 GA. CONST. OF 1777 art. LXIII.  
 87 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that after successive drafts of a constitution had been rejected 
by the existing governing body, the legislature elected delegates to a constitutional convention to 
be ratified by the towns).  
 88 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 627 (2013).  See generally HARRY M. WARD, UNITE OR DIE: 
INTERCOLONY RELATIONS 1690–1763, at 52 (1971) (detailing the extensive history of war 
conventions in the era prior to the Philadelphia Convention).  
 89 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 640 (2013). 
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Charles Black is among the leading scholars who contend that an Article 
V convention may only be unlimited, which he argues would render any 
application for a convention without plenary scope invalid under Article V.90  
This argument is constructed without citing any convention prior to the 
Philadelphia Convention and without reference to any state constitution’s 
amendment provision.91  Black does cite ten applications for a convention to 
Congress between 1790 and the Civil War, noting that of the ten, nine were 
unlimited.92  Black then asserts that the “theory of the convention limited by 
the tenor of the state petitions is nothing but a child of the twentieth 
century.”93   
However, the history of conventions prior to the Philadelphia 
Convention illustrates that they were frequently limited by subject matter.  
Georgia’s constitution, which is structurally analogous to the initial iterations 
of Article V,94 also provides for a limited convention.95  It simply is not the 
case that the notion of a limited convention first arose in the twentieth 
century.96  Nor can the text of Article V’s call for a “Convention for 
proposing amendments” be dispositive or even indicative of the fact that a 
convention necessarily has plenary power to propose amendments, as Black 
claims.97  This wording in Article V merely distinguishes a convention at 
which amendments may be proposed from a convention for trade, for 
proposing statutes, for defense, or for proposing treaties.98  James Madison  
articulated his vision for a limited convention of the states at the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention in response to Patrick Henry’s contention that 
Congress had too central a role in proposing amendments, stating that the 
“committee will see that there is another mode provided . . . besides that 
 
 90 Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 196–204 
(1972).  
 91 Id.  
 92 Id. at 202. 
 93 Id. at 203 (emphasis omitted). 
 94 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 622 (2013).  
 95 GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LXIII (“No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions 
from a majority of the counties . . . at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called 
for that purpose, specifying the alterations to be made . . . .”).  
 96 See generally, CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 3–16, 95–101 (detailing the history of conventions in the 
United States, along with English antecedents, illustrating the wide array of limited purposes for 
which conventions were historically called).  
 97 Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 203 (1972). 
 98 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 99.  
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which originates with Congress [whereby] conventions which shall be so 
called will have their deliberations confined to a few points.”99  A textual 
analysis of Article V, coupled with historical evidence from before, during, 
and after the Philadelphia Convention, does not support the claim that a 
convention, if limited, is unconstitutional.  
B.  The Structural Basis for a Limited Convention 
Interpreting Article V to prohibit anything but an unlimited convention 
runs directly counter to its structure.  Article V’s bifurcated state- and 
Congress-initiated proposal mechanism reflects the federalist principles 
underpinning the Constitution that is “neither wholly National nor wholly 
Federal.”100  This structure was specifically altered to prevent Congress from 
possessing the sole authority to propose amendments,101 preserving a critical 
and structurally equal role for the states in proposing amendments.102  
Following George Mason’s critique of relying solely on Congress for 
proposing amendments, which was the structure provided by Madison’s 
draft,103 the delegates agreed without objection to include a provision 
enabling a convention to propose amendments without requiring the consent 
of Congress.104  Mason powerfully stated with respect to Madison’s draft of 
Article V that:  
By this article Congress only have the power of proposing amendments at 
any future time to this constitution and should it prove ever so oppressive, 
the whole people of America can’t make, or even propose alterations to it; a 
doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and 
liberties of the people.105  
The history of amendment since the Philadelphia Convention suggests 
that this feared inability to amend the Constitution in ways that run counter 
 
 99 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 101–02 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836). 
 100 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 101 See 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 557, 559, 629–32; see also AMAR, supra note 3, 290 (arguing that 
“in order to prevent a self-dealing Congress from simply bottling up needed reforms that might 
limit its own powers, Article V offered an alternative amendment-proposal system that would not 
depend on congressional will.”).  
 102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (emphasizing that the states and the federal government 
are situated on equal terms to identify constitutional defects and to propose amendments).  
 103 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 559.  
 104 See id. at 629–32.  
 105 See id. at 629 n.8.  
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to the self-interest and policy perspectives of Congress has been realized.106  
Again, in spite of hundreds of applications having been submitted to call a 
convention of states, no such convention has ever been called.  This outcome 
illustrates that the equal function of Congress and the states embodied by 
Article V has not translated to constitutional practice, instead according 
Congress what amounts to a veto on any amendment.107  The effect is much 
the same as that prescribed by Madison’s draft that was soundly rejected by 
the delegates,108 under which states could induce Congress to act, but only 
Congress could actually propose amendments to the Constitution.109  
Similarly, the absence of the role of states in proposing amendments 
diminishes the efficacy of the amendment system by practically barring the 
proposal of amendments that would limit the power of Congress either vis-
à-vis the states or vis-à-vis the other branches of the federal government, even 
when those amendments may be beneficial and receive broad public 
support.110  
The prospect of a convention of the states can affect the amendment 
process by inducing Congress to act to preempt a convention.  This function 
nevertheless falls far short of the parity between the states and Congress 
reflected by the dual proposal methods of Article V.111  The prospect of a 
convention was an important impetus motivating the ratification of the Bill 
 
 106 See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment 
Method and How to Fix Them, 96 U. VA. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (2010) (stating that “only those 
[amendments] that reflect the congressional preferences have had a realistic chance of passing.”).  
 107 See id. at 1567 (noting that Congress is unlikely to act in a manner that “would deprive it of the 
effective veto over the amendment process that it currently enjoys”); see also Robert G. Natelson, 
Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing Amendments,” 65 FLA. 
L. REV. 615, 622 (2013) (noting that “the [initial] draft [of Article V] was changed to insert the 
convention for proposing amendments to enable the states to propose amendments without a 
substantive veto by Congress.”).  
 108 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 629–32. 
 109 Id. at 559.  
 110 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention 
Amendment Method and How to Fix Them, 96 U. VA. L. REV. 1509, 1513 (2010) (suggesting that had 
Congress not possessed an effective veto over amendments, numerous popular amendments that 
diminish the power of Congress might well have been ratified, such as a line-item veto, 
congressional term limits, or a balanced budget requirement); BRENNAN, supra note 17, at 17 
(“Congress will, under no circumstances, cooperate in the calling of a convention that might 
propose amendments deleterious to their privileges, powers and benefits.”). 
 111 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 275 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (stating that 
Article V “equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of 
errors, as they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the other”).  
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of Rights.112  In a modern context, such pressure exerts less force on Congress 
because today there is far greater fear of a runaway convention than there 
was in the immediate aftermath of the Philadelphia Convention.113  Those 
dissatisfied with the product of the Philadelphia Convention sought far more 
fundamental changes to the Constitution than, for example, those calling for  
a balanced budget amendment or Congressional term limits today.114  Even 
though only New York and Virginia filed applications for a convention, the 
proliferation of Anti-Federalists who sought a convention to fundamentally 
change the constitutional system was sufficient to induce Congress to act 
because the Bill of Rights affirmed individual rights but did not diminish the 
essential powers possessed by the federal government, making it a worthwhile 
risk-mitigating concession.115  Today, the risks of unpredictable change 
feared by those skeptical of a convention of states are more likely to outweigh 
the interests of the less foundational amendments proposed.  The threat of 
convention therefore carries less weight, and half of the proposal mechanism 
under Article V is left doing very little work.   
The hesitance on the part of a number of the Framers regarding the 
prospect of a second convention lends further support to the structural 
argument that Article V conventions need not be unlimited.  In response to 
 
 112 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 3, at 317 (emphasizing that the prospect of a convention applied pressure 
on those weighing ratification); Michael Stokes Paulson, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional 
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 741 n.215 (1993) (explaining that Madison 
was induced to lobby for a Bill of Rights to obviate the need states may have perceived to apply for 
a convention that Congress could not deny); 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL SATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 37 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 
1836) (“[What if, when faced with the prospect of amendment, Members of Congress] interrupt it 
from motives of self-interest. What then? We will resist, did my friend say? conveying an idea of 
force. Who shall dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in Convention; wholly recall our 
delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such abuse; and punish those servants who have 
perverted powers, designed for our happiness, to their own emolument.”) (emphasis added).  
 113 See Michael B. Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment 
Method and How to Fix Them, 96 U. VA. L. REV. 1509, 1535 (2010) (arguing that “the early years 
under the Constitution are atypical, because at that time many state legislators were not scared of 
a runaway convention, but instead hoped a convention would significantly revise the 
Constitution.”).  
 114 See CAPLAN, supra note 8, at vii (noting that even when thirty-two of the thirty-four states needed to 
cause Congress to call a convention had applied for a convention to propose a balanced budget 
amendment, Congress was not sufficiently threatened to propose such an amendment); Michael B. 
Rappaport, Reforming Article V: The Problems Created by the National Convention Amendment Method and How 
to Fix Them, 96 U. VA. L. REV. 1509, 1535 (2010).  
 115 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 39.  
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dissatisfied Framers’ calls for a second convention,116 Charles Pinckney 
retorted that “[n]othing but confusion and contrariety could spring from the 
experiment,” emphasizing that conventions “ought not be repeated.”117  
James Madison similarly feared the prospect of a second convention, 
concerned that it would wreak havoc on the work achieved at the 
Philadelphia Convention.118  He “saw no objection however against 
providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments,”119 speaking of 
conventions as “confined to a few points.”120  Given these concerns, taking 
the position that a convention can only have plenary power, that is the power 
to make substantial structural shifts in the Constitution as opposed to being 
limited to a discrete subject-matter, means that the Framers limited state-
initiated proposals to the type of convention most likely to realize exactly 
their expressed concerns.  A limited convention avoids these uncertainties 
and instability and, had the Framers conceived of exclusively unlimited 
conventions, the unanimous support for the addition of the convention clause 
in Article V is difficult to reconcile with the stated concerns of a second 
convention.  The prospect of a limited convention resolves that discrepancy.  
This failure to comport with the structure of Article V can be remedied 
by embracing a limited convention of the states.  Given the concern of a 
runaway convention, coupled with the fear that an unlimited convention—
even if called to perform one specific task such as imposing Congressional 
term limits—could result in the proposal of amendments that achieve 
something different entirely, it is very difficult to reach the thirty-four 
 
 116 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 632 (quoting Edmund Randolph as saying “A second 
Convention will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system more 
consonant to it.”); 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 479 (noting that absent changes to the constitution, 
George Mason’s “wish would then be to bring the whole subject before another general 
Convention”).  
 117 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 632 (“He descanted on the consequences of calling forth the 
deliberations & amendments of the different States on the subject of Government at large.  Nothing 
but confusion & contrariety could spring from the experiment.  The States will never agree in their 
plans—And the Deputies to a second Convention coming together under the discordant 
impressions of their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions are serious things, and ought not 
to be repeated[.]”).  
 118 See, e.g., BEEMAN, supra note 3, at 339 (noting that Madison “hoped at all costs to avoid the calling 
of additional constitutional conventions, for he feared that such conventions might well undo the 
work they were doing in Philadelphia”).  
 119 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 29.  
 120 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL SATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 102 (Jonathan Elliot ed. 1836). 
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applications from state legislatures required to call a convention of the states.  
The experience of the states, where calls for unlimited conventions have led 
to the defeat of proposals to amend,121 and where limited conventions been 
introduced to allay concerns of unpredictable and sweeping amendments 
and have operated within the scope of their mandates,122 lends further 
credence to the viability of this approach on the federal level.  Calling a 
convention limited to a specific subject matter—such as was prescribed by 
the call for the Providence Convention of 1776–1777, restricting the relevant 
subjects to paper money and public credit—alleviates the concern of a 
runaway convention.123  Article V compels Congress to call a convention 
upon receipt of applications from two-thirds of the states.124  That convention 
is in turn limited to the call from Congress, meaning that proposals that go 
beyond that authority, even if ratified, would not be valid amendments to the 
Constitution.125  Consequently, proposals from two-thirds of the states for a 
convention limited to one, or a number of specified subjects, prevent the 
harm that could ensue from a runaway convention producing undesirable 
and potentially expansive fundamental constitutional change.  
The concern of a runaway convention is substantially mitigated by a 
second structural feature of Article V: the result of an amendment proposed 
by either of the prescribed means is still subject to ratification by three-
fourths of the states.126  Moreover, Congress itself chooses whether state 
 
 121 See G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Getting from Here to There: Twenty-first Century Mechanisms and 
Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1085 (2005) (noting that referenda 
for unlimited conventions were defeated due to fear of excessively broad change in New York and 
Rhode Island).  
 122 See id. (“To counter these and other sorts of opposition [predicated on the idea that an unlimited 
convention is a Pandora’s Box to be feared] to constitutional conventions, states developed the 
limited constitutional convention, which limits the range of matters to be considered . . . .”).  
 123 Robert G. Natelson, Founding-Era Conventions and the Meaning of the Constitution’s “Convention for Proposing 
Amendments,” 65 FLA. L. REV. 615, 640 (2013). 
 124 U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . . .”).   
 125 See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, supra note 61, at 56–57 (2012) (“If the convention were to violate 
the limitations in the call—if it were to propose an amendment that was not within the scope of its 
authority—then that proposal would be unconstitutional.”).  
 126 U.S. CONST. art. V (“[A proposed amendment] shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part 
of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by 
Conventions in three fourths thereof . . . .”).   
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legislatures or conventions ratify.127  This independent ratification 
requirement was instituted to “guard against a despotic federal convention 
that might try to crown itself king,” which is a critical feature in that this 
substantial limitation renders the convention of states “a more credible 
weapon” that can be wielded even by those who wish only to invoke the 
prospect of a convention to induce Congressional action.128  This structural 
limitation means that whatever the concern of those fearing a convention of 
the states that sought to institute dramatic change that outpaced popular will, 
a considerable thirty-eight states would still need to ratify each amendment 
to accord those changes binding constitutional effect.   
The types of amendments most commonly proposed today do not 
corroborate the argument that a runaway convention would result.  A 
balanced budget amendment and an amendment to impose Congressional 
term limits are the most frequent subjects in applications submitted by state 
legislatures to Congress.129  Neither of these proposals rise to the level of 
concern stated by skeptics of a convention of the states, such as by illimitably 
“making wholesale changes to our Constitution and Bill of Rights,”130 even 
if the infeasibility of thirty-eight states ratifying such unpredictable largescale 
amendments to the Constitution were disregarded arguendo.  
These two commonly proposed amendments also fall squarely within the 
contours of the convention method conceptualized by the Framers by 
preventing Congress from blocking amendments that could reduce its 
power.131  The rationale underpinning the shift away from Madison’s draft 
 
 127 Id. (“[A proposal may become an amendment] when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of 
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .”).  
 128 AMAR, supra note 3, at 290.  
 129 See House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019).  
 130 Arthur Goldberg, The Proposed Constitutional Convention, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 2 (1983) 
(“There is nothing in Article V that prevents a convention from making wholesale changes to our 
Constitution and Bill of Rights.”); see also Michael Stokes Paulson, A General Theory of Article V: The 
Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 742 (1993) (“[A convention 
could] propose radically new government arrangements and greatly enlarged—or diminished—
individual rights.”); Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment 
Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 431 (1983) (“[The convention method in Article V] represents a 
domestication of the right to revolution.”).  
 131 See, e.g., 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 629 (citing George Mason’s argument that an amendment 
provision that relies solely on Congress for proposals is “exceptionable & dangerous,” inducing the 
change to include a convention of the states as a proposal method under Article V); AMAR, supra 
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that enabled only Congress to propose amendments was that it would not do 
so if its power would be thereby limited vis-à-vis the states or another branch 
of the federal government.132  Congressional term limits and a balanced 
budget amendment do just that.  A balanced budget amendment tethers 
congressional spending to money brought in.  Term limits set discrete 
timelines for Members of Congress after which point they can no longer 
continue in those positions.  Irrespective of the merit of these amendments, 
their effect of limiting congressional power makes it highly unlikely that two-
thirds of Congress would agree to propose them.  States are more convinced 
of their merit.133  Even where thirty-two of the requisite thirty-four states filed 
applications for a convention to propose a balanced budget amendment no 
such proposal resulted.134  This fact illustrates that popular will is not 
sufficient to induce Congress to propose an amendment that would reduce 
Congressional power.  These proposals are unlikely to produce a runaway 
convention, and also neatly comport with Article V and particularly with the 
structural function of allowing either Congress or a convention of the states 
to propose an amendment.   
CONCLUSION 
Calls for an Article V convention of the states are met by detractors with 
grave concern about the prospect of a runaway convention.  The separation 
between the conventions where amendments are proposed versus the 
subsequent ratification process guards against such an issue.  Calling a 
limited convention, geared to propose amendments with regard to a specific 
issue, such as congressional term limits, radically diminishes any such 
concern.  Opponents often resort to the claim that Article V prohibits limited 
conventions to present an Article V convention as inherently dangerous.  
However, an examination of the text, history, and structure of Article V 
 
note 3, at 290 (explaining that one virtue of Article V is that the dual proposal mechanism prevents 
Congress from blocking “needed reforms that might limit its own powers”).  
 132 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 203 (“It would be improper to require the consent of [Congress], 
because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent on that very account.”).  
 133 See, e.g., House Documents, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/memorials.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (illustrating that 
throughout the past half-century dozens of applications from states have been separately submitted 
requesting a convention to propose these amendments, with such applications continuing at least 
through 2017). 
 134 CAPLAN, supra note 8, at 39–40.  
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reveals that a convention need not be plenary to be constitutional under 
Article V.  This reading fits with the dual concerns of the Framers of fearing 
an additional full-blown constitutional convention on one hand, and 
ensuring the provision of a viable mechanism for permitting the states to 
amend the Constitution on the other.  The role of the states in proposing 
amendments prevents congressional self-dealing from stifling proposals that 
would limit congressional power irrespective of the merit of those 
amendments.  The consistent flow of applications from state legislatures for 
the purpose of calling a limited convention of the states is both constitutional 
under Article V and well-suited to vindicate the federalist character 
embedded in Article V.  
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